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WHEN COPS ARE ROBBERS-MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
FOR POLICE MISCONDUCT UNDER SECTION 1983 AND
BIVENS
Brenda D. Crocker*
Municipalities faced with rising crime rates, tighter budgets and
an increasingly vocal populace often are pressed to make policy de-
cisions which sacrifice important interests. When fiscal considera-
tions predominate, there arises the danger that local police depart-
ments will be unable to fulfill their duty to ensure order in society
without disturbing citizens' enjoyment of their civil rights. Until
recently, improperly trained, supervised or disciplined police of-
ficers merely subjected municipalities to embarrassment. However,
with increasing success, citizens are arguing that they should be
awarded damages against the municipality in every case where
their civil rights have been deprived through police misconduct.
Sympathetic courts are moving closer to this position, predicating
liability not only upon express municipal policy which violates civil
rights but also upon official inaction in the face of recurrent or
egregious police misconduct.
In 1972 the Supreme Court recognized the need for redress
against official misuse of municipal authority in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno.1 There, the plaintiff citizen's civil rights had been violated
by official action; yet relief against a municipality was unavailable
because of the Court's interpretation of the governing statute. In
* B.A., Agnes Scott College, 1971; J.D., Washington & Lee University, 1980.
1. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
2. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured to an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
At the time of the City of Kenosha opinion, the Court interpreted the legislative history
of § 1983 to exclude municipalities from the definition of "persons" and to preclude suit
against the municipality when it caused a violation of civil rights. See, e.g., City of Kenosha
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startling dictum, the Court urged the lower court on remand to
consider the availability of federal question jurisdiction.3 The
Court did not formally suggest that relief in such an action could
include the judicially created remedies of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,4 which had
been developed in response to federal police misconduct. However,
by encouraging the use of federal question jurisdiction, the Court
opened the door to Bivens actions against municipalities by sug-
gesting the use of the fourteenth amendment as an alternative to
Section 1983 and, thus, as a means of recovering damages against a
municipality for civil rights violations.
In 1977, the Court further opened the door to such suits in the
unanimous decision of Mount Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle.5 There the Court expressly approved the
initiation of a procedural due process claim against a local school
board pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, despite the board's
argument that the Section 1983 prohibition against suing a munici-
pality should be extended to federal question cases.6
In 1978 the Court took another startling turn in Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services.7 Breaking with its traditional inter-
pretation of Section 1983, the Court declared that a municipality
could be held liable in damages under Section 1983 for civil rights
violations pursuant to its unconstitutional official customs, policies
and practices. Expanding the availability of this relief in Owen v.
City of Independence,8 the 1980 Court held that a municipality
enjoys no immunity defense against a prima facie showing of
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
3. 412 U.S. at 514.
4. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court created the Bivens remedy by inferring a cause of
action for damages directly under the fourth amendment. Jurisdiction was predicated upon
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). See also notes 73-87 infra and accompanying text.
5. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
6. Id. at 279. The Court recognized the importance of deciding whether a Bivens cause of
action for damages should be inferred under the fourteenth amendment despite the exis-
tence of § 1983 but declined to do so, finding the question too important to be "decided on
this record." Id. at 278.
7. 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (municipality is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983)
(overruling Monroe v. Pape but reaffirming City of Kenosha's opinion that the word "per-
son" in § 1983 was to be applied to municipalities according to the nature of the relief
sought.
8. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
[Vol. 15:295
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
liability.9
As a consequence of the Court's doctrinal expansion under Sec-
tion 1983, lower courts have been faced with an escalating struggle.
Plaintiffs who are injured by police misconduct seek the deep
pocket offered by the municipal exchequer. Their primary effort
has been to expand the Section 1983 concepts of "official policy"
and causation, while seeking alternative relief under Bivens. Mu-
nicipalities, concerned with protecting their coffers, have met the
onslaught by denying legal responsibility for individual officers'
allegedly unconstitutional acts and by arguing the exclusiveness of
Section 1983 relief.
The question the Supreme Court must now address is under
what circumstance a victim of municipal inaction toward local po-
lice misconduct may pursue relief under both Section 1983 and
Bivens. Victims are now encouraged by the Supreme Court's re-
cent willingness to reinterpret formerly well established civil rights
theories and, yet, are concerned that relief in lower courts will turn
on whether the plaintiff was fortunate enough to be injured in a
receptive jurisdiction.10 It will, therefore, be necessary to press the
courts for definitive guidance as to available remedies. To resolve
the existing lack of uniformity and prevent further inequity, the
Supreme Court should resolve the three issues on which the lower
courts are split: whether municipal inaction, despite recurrent po-
lice misconduct, will constitute a policy for Section 1983 purposes;
whether such inaction can constitute the necessary causation under
Section 1983; and whether a plaintiff may seek alternative relief
under Bivens via the fourteenth amendment. The following review
of the Supreme Court's doctrinal outline of Section 1983 and Biv-
ens and the lower courts' conflicting resolutions of the narrower
issues will demonstrate the need for clarification in cases of munic-
ipal inaction.
9. Id. at 638.
10. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reassessment of civil rights remedies against
a municipality and the potential for reassessment of municipal inaction cases, see note 7
supra, notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text. For discussion of conflicting lower court
holdings on the availability of relief under § 1983 for municipal inaction, see notes 32-51
infra and accompanying text. For discussion of conflicting lower court decisions as to the
availability of alternative relief under Bivens, see notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text.
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I. RELIEF FOR POLICE MISCONDUCT UNDER SECTION 1983
A. The Prima Facie Case
A plaintiff injured by police misconduct makes a prima facie
case against a municipality under Section 1983 when he shows that
the entity, through its officers' acts and under "color of law," has
caused the deprivation of a federally secured right.11
A plaintiff must first show the existence and denial of a right
which either arises under a federal statute 2 or which is constitu-
tionally guaranteed by incorporation under the fourteenth amend-
ment.18 Second, he must show that the acts which denied the right
were performed "under color of" state law. This category includes
all acts done "under pretense of law," 4 or "in the course of...
performance of duties under the [state] statute."' The broad lan-
guage of Section 1983, "under color of any [state] statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage,"16 presents the most difficult
11. See note 2 supra. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (plaintiff need
not allege bad faith by defendant); Board of Regents at the Univ. of the State of N.Y. v.
Tomaino, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980) (state statute of limitations is applied unless inconsistent
with federal law); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276
(1977) (allegation of $10,000 in controversy is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes unless
court determines "to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount"); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963) (no exhaustion of state
remedies required).
12. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2504 (1980) (denial of welfare benefits to which
plaintiff was entitled under 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976) (Social Security Act)).
13. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (right to procedural due process); Lynch
v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542-52 (1972) (property rights included in concept of
due process); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 323-29 (1941) (right to participate in
primary election under sections 2 and 4 of article I of the Constitution). But see Vitex v.
Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1261 (1980) (right to procedural due process in involuntary transfer
from prison to mental hospital); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709, 711 (1976) (not a property
right where merely an expectation of benefit and defamation by state official does not rise to
level of constitutional violation); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)
(right not to be discriminated against on basis of race).
14. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (construing "under color of" state law
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976), crimifial counterpart to § 1983). See also Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. at 184-85 ("under color of" state law carries same meaning under § 1983 as it
does under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976)).
15. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325 (1941). "Misuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the au-
thority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." Id. at 326 (citing Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). See also note 2 supra.
298
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proof problem. Included in the statute as a means of diminishing
violence in the post-bellum South, 17 this phrase was intended to
cover every form of official decision."" Where the offensive act is
authorized by statute, regulation, or like form of state action pur-
suant to express policy, this element is easily proven.19 However,
where the action is motivated by unwritten policy, such as munici-
pal custom or persistent practice,20 or by official inaction,21 a plain-
tiff's task is greater. The consistency of response necessary to show
custom may be difficult to prove, and proof of official inaction may
create an inference of either municipal approval or official igno-
rance of the violations.2
Inextricably tied to the problem of proof is the element of causa-
tion. A plaintiff must show that the municipality has subjected
17. "A condition of affairs now exists in some states of the Union rendering life and prop-
erty insecure ... that the power to correct those evils is beyond the control of state author-
ities I do not doubt." Message of President Grant to Congress, March 23, 1871, CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Seas. 274 (1871). See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 274
(1871) (remarks by Mr. Lowe of Kansas).
18. Section 1983 w~s passed to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason
of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 180.
19. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (official written
policy requiring employee to take pregnancy leave before medically required).
20. In Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Court determined that Con-
gress had included customs within § 1983 "because of the persistent practices of state offi-
cials," even though those practices are not enforced by state statute. Id. at 167. In Monell
the Court ruled that custom would be actionable in a written policy case. 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978).
21. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-77 (1976) where the Court held that official
inaction is not actionable if there is no showing of a persistent practice of violations or of
official authorization or approval of misconduct.
22. Id. Although the Court refused to base liability on official inaction, Rizzo should be
read as being consistent with Monell's statement that custom is actionable. See note 20
supra. Therefore, Rizzo must stand for the proposition that an official inaction claim must
be backed by proof of a persistent practice which could not have reasonably escaped official
knowledge. It cannot stand for the proposition that official inaction states no claim without
proof of official approval or authorization. This interpretation is strengthened by the Court's
holding in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in which a prisoner brought action against
officials who failed to provide minimal medical care in an emergency. The Court held that
the officials' inaction, which rose to the level of "deliberate indifference," was actionable via
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 106. See
also notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text.
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him or caused him to be subjected to harm.2 3 In ostensibly clear
language, the Court has stated that Section 1983 "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a [person] re-
sponsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 2' By using
general intent language, the Court has defined the causal relation-
ship required in written policy or custom cases. The question left
unanswered, however, is how to identify the causal link required in
cases of municipal inaction with regard to recurrent misconduct.
The Court has clearly stated that liability cannot be predicated
upon respondeat superior.2 5 Further, in Rizzo v. Goode,"8 the
Court denied recovery against high ranking police and city officials
for harm caused by numerous incidents of police misconduct be-
cause the plaintiffs were unable to show a persistent practice or
official authorization or approval.27 Yet, the Court also has indi-
cated its favor toward a claim based on a municipality's failure to
enforce existing legislation 8 and has expressly left open the possi-
bility of predicating recovery upon a pure negligence theory.2"
B. The Lower Courts' Disagreement
The lower courts are, thus, left to struggle with the Court's reti-
cence to base municipal liability on less than a persistent practice
23. See note 2 supra.
24. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187.
25. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. at 692-94.
26. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
27. Id. at 371, 375. However, "systematic maladministration ... or a neglect or refusal to
enforce" facially just laws has been recognized as a liability basis which Congress intended.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Seas., App. 153 (1871) (remarks by Rep. Garfield). See also
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 180 (§ 1983 passed partly because of state failure to enforce
existing laws). This language is of critical importance in official inaction cases, since the
questions of how to define official policy and how to pinpoint causation frequently appear to
be the same question. For a general discussion of policy and causation, see notes 32-51 infra
and accompanying text.
28. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 167-68 n.39. However, a claim cannot be
based on a state's, and presumably its political subdivisions' failure to enact corrective legis-
lation. Id.
29. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). The Court saw no need to decide the
negligence question since it found no rights violated. Id. at 140-46. Last term, the Court
again entertained a negligence claim but denied recovery since the harm was so remote as to
preclude a showing of proximate causation. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1979), re-
hearing denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980) (state parole decision merely set in motion a series of
events whereby an unforeseeable plaintiff was killed by parolee).
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or authorization on one hand, and its suggestion, on the other
hand, that liability may be predicated on negligence or on failure
to enforce existing legislation. This struggle presents itself in lower
court decisions as a search for a workable definition of policy and
causation. With respect to policy, the controversy concerns the
point at which inaction permits an inference of tacit official ap-
proval or authorization. In terms of causation, the issue is the
point at which a municipality must take legal responsibility for its
lower level officials' active violations of federal rights and its higher
level officials' failure to take corrective action.
Although these issues appear to be conceptually distinct, they
are blended in inaction cases because the same proof is used to
satisfy both the policy showing and the causation requirement.
Courts that seem to follow a pro-plaintiff pattern appear to ground
their decisions in causation language,30 while courts in which the
decisions generally have favored municipalities, whether or not
they were faced squarely with an inaction case, appear to find an
insufficient showing of official policy. 1 The danger to plaintiffs in
jurisdictions which generally have found for municipalities is not
that these courts have disagreed on what facts are necessary to
show causation. Rather, the danger is in the precedent set by these
courts, which appears to have cut off all discussion of causation
and raised a strong barrier to a showing of policy.
In the first category are cases such as Popow v. City of Mar-
gate,32 where the court separated the issues of policy and causa-
tion. With little discussion, the court found a de facto municipal
policy based on the city's recurrent failure to train and supervise
police officers. The same factual basis was used to prove causa-
tion.33 Further, the court stated that to show causation the plain-
tiff must show an afirmative link between municipal inaction and
the alleged harm. The link is not supplied by a showing of inaction
30. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 35-45 infra and accompanying text.
32. 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1979). See also Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.
1980); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242
(2d Cir. 1979); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. I1. 1979); North Am. Cold Storage
v. County of Cook, 468 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F.
Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978).
33. 476 F. Supp. at 1246-47.
1981] 301
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toward lower level officers' acts of simple negligence. However, the
link is provided by proof of inaction toward acts of gross negli-
gence, recklessness or deliberate indifference. Inaction in the face
of these more serious acts is proof of official acquiescence in the
harm. Without explaining why inaction constitutes the necessary
link in one case but not in the other, the court appears to have
based its causation finding on an arbitrary distinction between
what a citizen should reasonably expect to tolerate from police of-
ficers and what can be said to have occurred under the municipal-
ity's tacit direction. By way of explanation, the court stated that a
municipality's failure to train or supervise subordinates adequately
is actionable so long as the municipality knew or reasonably should
have known of the subordinates' propensity to violate federal
rights. However, municipal inaction in the face of only one viola-
tion is not actionable, unless the act is unusually brutal."
Reading the Popow decision as whole, it appears that the court
based municipal liability on general intent shown factually, either
through municipal inaction following violations that were reason-
ably anticipated or following unanticipated but severe violations.
Courts which primarily have rendered pro-municipality decisions
have given no indication that they differ philosophically with the
Popow line of reasoning which establishes a relationship between
policy and causation. They do differ, however, in their unwilling-
ness to recognize the existence of a policy.35 In fact, the court in
one such case, Smith v. Ambrogio,3 6 indicated that it would not
base liability on inaction leading to a mere pattern of violations, as
did the Popow court.
In Smith, the plaintiff sued the Town of Hamden, the police
chief and two officers under Section 1983. 37 He alleged violations of
his civil rights, charging that his arrest was both warrantless and
34. Id. at 1245-46. The case specifically turns on inaction in the form of failure to train or
supervise adequately. Arguably, inaction to other forms, such as failure to discipline or oth-
erwise correct subordinates after a violative incident, are far more egregious.
35. See, e.g., United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1979); Cale v. City
of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir.
1978); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Smith
v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978).
36. 456 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978).
37. Id. at 1132.
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without probable cause and that the town officials had failed to
institute "reasonable procedures in the selection, supervision, as-
signing and training of its police officers to prevent, such viola-
tions."38 The plaintiff further alleged that this inaction by the
town and its agents proximately caused the violations which re-
sulted in plaintiff's harm and that it was foreseeable that the viola-
tions would result from the inaction."
Beginning with a discussion of how to recognize the policy for
Section 1983 purposes, the Smith court acknowledged that inac-
tion cases present a far more difficult task than do cases of written
directives and persistent practices which may have developed into
custom. 40 However, the court did not compare the facts which
show inaction to those which show a persistent practice. Instead, it
merely recited its circuit's holding,' 1 basing liability on a de facto
policy pursuant to concerted activity which the Smith court was
unable to define.'2
The court then moved to a discussion of causation in inaction
cases. It stated that failure to act when action is necessary to abate
a continuing violation is likely to result in a claim if the plaintiff
can show that an official actually knew of or, by law, was charged
with knowledge of the violations.43 By contrast, the court predicted
that failure to act so as to prevent a violation which conforms to a
pattern is not likely to result in a claim unless the facts show "the
equivalent of approval of the pattern as a policy. . . and hence
tacit encouragement that the pattern continue.'"" Categorizing the
instant case as a failure to prevent a violation which conforms to a
pattern, the court came full circle and declined to infer the exis-
tence of a municipal policy from inaction.'5
The Fourth Circuit also has been hesitant to find a showing of
official policy sufficient to incur liability.46 As in Smith, the Fourth
38. Id. at 1133 n.2.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1134-35.
41. Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978).
42. 456 F. Supp. at 1135-36.
43. Id. at 1136.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Burt v. Abel, 585
1981] 303
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Circuit has strongly stated its commitment to the view that, unless
a plaintiff clearly shows the existence of a municipal policy, causa-
tion is irrelevant.47 In Fourth Circuit cases, this view has been
stated in a manner similar but not identical to the language found
in Monell v. Department of Social Services.4 The Fourth Circuit
has based liability on express policy and official custom49 but has
rejected the more far-reaching Monell language which recognized
that the behavior of high-ranking officials may constitute the pol-
icy of the municipality itself.50
By emphasizing the stricter language of Monell, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has established an obstacle to misconduct victims who must
make a showing of policy in order to recover from a municipality.
By contrast, the pro-plaintiff view of the Popow court gives fuller
expression to the Monell definition of policy. The Popow view rec-
ognizes that official inaction toward recurrent police misconduct
can constitute as strong a statement of municipal policy as does a
written directive. Without attempting to define policy in a munici-
pal inaction context, the Monell court may have anticipated that a
case such as Popow could arise, and sought to leave the way open
for a pro-plaintiff result when the municipality takes an inactive
approach to its supervisory duty. "By our decision in Rizzo v.
Goode, we would appear to have decided that the mere right to
control without any control or direction having been exercised and
without any failure to supervise is not enough to support Section
1983 liability.5 1
F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir. 1978).
47. 586 F.2d at 312.
48. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
49. 586 F.2d at 312. In Monell, the Court cautioned that
the language of § 1983 read against the background of the . . .legislative history,
compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable
unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitu-
tional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tort-feasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
436 U.S. at 691.
50. In Monell, the Court also stated that the municipality may be held liable "when exe-
cution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." 436
U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
51. 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 15:295
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IE. ALTERNATIVE RELEF UNDER Bivens
A. Introduction
Plaintiffs who are unfortunate enough to be injured in a jurisdic-
tion which does not recognize municipal inaction as a policy for
Section 1983 purposes are left with two alternatives. They may
accept what recovery is afforded by the police officer's shallow
pocket, or they may attempt to reach municipal coffers through
the judicially created remedy of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.5 2
When a plaintiff chooses to invoke the Bivens alternative against
a municipality, he brings a suit for damages for those municipal
actions which may have caused a violation of his fourteenth
amendment rights. Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1331(a), which allows federal district courts -o hear cases in-
volving a federal question.
On their face, a Section 1983 action and a Bivens claim involving
police misconduct appear coextensive. In each case, the plaintiff
seeks monetary relief for the municipality's violation of rights se-
cured to him through the fourteenth amendment. However, the
difference between these cases becomes clear upon understanding
that neither Section 1983 nor Bivens creates a substantive right in
the plaintiff.53 Instead, each is a remedy designed to redress the
violation of federally secured rights.5"
Section 1983 was passed by Congress pursuant to its enforce-
ment power under the fourteenth amendment.55 Rather than cre-
ate a substantive right under Section 1983, Congress created a
cause of action.5 8 By contrast, the Bivens remedy is a judicially
created form of redress. It is based on the Supreme Court's view
52. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The policeman's pocket may not even be available under a theory
of sovereign immunity. For a discussion of the doctrine see Taylor, A Re-examination of
Sovereign Tort Immunity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 245 (1981).
53. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (§ 1983 pro-
vides a remedy, not a substantive right); see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568
(1871) (remarks by Sen. Edmunds).
54. 441 U.S. at 617-18.
55. See Id. at 651 (White, J., concurring); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong, 1st Sess., App. 68, 80,
83-85 (1871).
56. 441 U.S. at 617.
1981]
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that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. '57 Bivens relief,
then, is wholly equitable relief which federal courts provide as a
supplement to relief which Congress has expressly provided. Al-
though the remedy was fashioned in response to civil rights viola-
tions by federal officials, 8 there is nothing in the Bivens decision
or in its progeny which suggests that it should not be applied to
cases of fourteenth amendment violations. Indeed, the above
quoted statement from Bivens suggests that redress will be forth-
coming merely upon a showing of need and the invasion of a fed-
eral right. Despite this suggestion, however, several jurisdictions
have refused to allow plaintiffs to seek damages against a munici-
pality on a Bivens theory.5 9
Prior to the Monell Court's reinterpretation of Section 1983 leg-
islative history so as to allow suits against a municipality,60 the
Fourth Circuit suggested that it would rule favorably upon a plain-
tiff's Bivens claim for damages against a municipality via the four-
teenth amendment.6 At that time, the majority of circuits agreed
that this form of relief was an appropriate alternative to Section
1983.2 The Supreme Court, without ruling precisely on this point,
had also indicated that it favored a claim pursuant to federal ques-
tion jurisdiction's as an alternative to Section 1983."
A slight shift in approach began to appear among the various
circuits, however, after the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Monell"5 Although the majority of circuits have not yet aban-
57. 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
58. Id. at 391-92.
59. See notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 2 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Singleton v. Vance County
Bd. of Educ., 501 oF.2d 429, 432 (4th Cir. 1974) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. In Cale v. City of Covington, the Fourth Circuit catalogued the circuits' positions on
this issue as of 1978. 586 F.2d at 314-15. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits were in favor of implying such a cause of action while the Third and Tenth
Circuits were undecided. The First and Fourth Circuits opposed the implication.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
64. See, e.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1972). In a concurring opinion,
Justices Brennan and Marshall specifically stated that the cause of action did exist. Id. at
516.
65. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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doned their Bivens policy, there is room to argue the development
of a trend."6 The Fourth Circuit, in Cale v. City of Covington,6 7
stated a strong opposition to the inference of a damages action
under the fourteenth amendment. Writing for the panel, Judge
Widener argued that the existence of federal court jurisdiction to
hear an action for damages under the fourteenth amendment does
not require a finding that the cause of action exists.68 As persuasive
authority, Judge Widener cited Supreme Court decisions contem-
poraneous with the passage of the amendment in which the Court
discussed its refusal to usurp Congress' enforcement power under
the fourteenth amendment.69 Judge Widener argued that such
cases, when read together, make it clear "that the Congress and
Supreme Court of the time were in agreement that affirmative re-
lief under the [fourteenth] amendment should come from Con-
gress."17 0 By ignoring the Bivens Court's finding that federal courts
traditionally have provided equitable redress for federal rights vio-
lations 7 1 the Fourth Circuit has thus discouraged police miscon-
duct victims from seeking adequate compensation via the deep
municipal pocket.7 2
66. The Third Circuit decided against the inference of such an action, believing that "it
would be a redundant and wasteful use of judicial resources to permit.., both direct con-
stitutional and § 1983 claims where the latter wholly subsumes the former." Fogin v. Ben-
salem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 686-87 (3d Cir. 1980). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
denied such an action on essentially the same grounds. Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d
311 (4th Cir. 1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978).
For post-Monett decisions favoring this action, see, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152
(2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Monell sub nom.,
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), modified on remand., 591 F.2d 426 (2d
Cir. 1979) (en banc), aff'd, Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980); Dean v. Gladney,
621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1980); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979); Jones
v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386
(6th Cir. 1978); Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977); Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 902, on remand, 589
F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 622, rehearing denied, 446 U.S.
993 (1980).
67. 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 314.
69. Id. at 315-26 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 111 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 399 (1880)).
70. Cale v. Covington, 586 F.2d at 316.
71. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
72. In Cale, the plaintiff was denied relief under a Bivens theory that he had an alterna-
tive to pursue. "[T]he plaintiff here has a remedy, perhaps not perfect, but that which was
contemplated by Congress." 586 F.2d at 317.
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Consequently, in order to bring about uniformity and thereby
diminish the inequity suffered by many plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court should address the issue of whether a Bivens claim may be
brought against a municipality via the fourteenth amendment. A
review of Bivens and its progeny should encourage these plaintiffs
to press their claims.
B. The Bivens Decision
In 1967, Webster Bivens brought suit in federal court for dam-
ages resulting from federal agents' alleged warrantless search of his
premises, use of unreasonable force in effecting his arrest, and lack
of probable cause to arrest him.73 Bivens based his claim on both
Section 198374 and the fourth amendment.7 5 The district court
dismissed the claim, finding neither state action nor a federal ques-
tion.7 6 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no con-
stitutional basis for an action for damages under the Constitu-
tion. 7 Although the court acknowledged that a common law right
of action could arise under the language of the fourth amend-
ment,78 it held that Bivens' only remedy was a tort action in state
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.
Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). Bivens claimed that his home was searched, that he was hand-
cuffed in front of his family, and that family members were threatened with arrest. The
agents then took him to the Brooklyn federal courthouse, where they searched, interrogated
and booked him. The charges against Bivens were subsequently dismissed. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 388-90.
74. See note 2 supra. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), which reads as
follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens
or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
It is noteworthy that Congress did not place a jurisdictional amount requirement in the
statute.
75. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), which reads as follows: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in con-
troversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
76. 276 F. Supp. at 13-14.
77. 409 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 721.
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court."'
In a landmark decision, the Supeme Court reversed the circuit
court on two bases.8 0 First, the Court stated that to restrict this
case to state tort law is to take "an unduly restrictive view of the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seraches and
seizures by federal agents, a view.. . consistently.., rejected by
this Court."'81 The Court cautioned that federal agents "[possess] a
far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser....
Thus, the Court reasoned, redress should not depend upon the va-
garies of state tort law;83 nor should redress depend upon the state
court's improper usurpation of the federal courts' authority to
limit the exercise of federal power."
As its second decisional basis, the Court found that damages tra-
ditionally have been considered "the ordinary remedy for an in-
vasion of personal interests in liberty."8 5 Perceiving no conflict
with federal fiscal policy, the Court considered Congressional ap-
proval unnecessary.86 Although the fourth amendment does not
provide explicitly for damages recovery, the Court fashioned such a
remedy in Bivens by inferring its existence from the amendment's
language.87
79. Id.
80. 403 U.S. at 388.
81. Id. at 391.
82. Id. at 392.
83. Id.
[T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power
regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would
prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen. It guarantees
to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority. And "where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
84. Id. at 394 (citing In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890)).
85. Id. at 395.
86. Id. at 396.
87. On remand the Second Circuit found this cause of action "roughly analagous" to a
§ 1983 action, but denied immunity to the agents, whom it perceived as having acted in
their ministerial capacity. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1344-47 (2d Cir. 1972). The court adopted the qualified immunity
standard of the Restatement of Torts for police officers' actions within their discretionary
capacity, namely acts "within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty." Id. at 1343 (quot-
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C. Post Bivens Relief
In the wake of Bivens, federal courts have been called upon to
determine whether similar causes of action should be inferred from
other constitutional provisions and ultimately whether these
claims may be brought against municipalities under the fourteenth
amendment.88 Although the circuit courts have been active in this
area,8 9 the Supreme Court has decided only two cases. In Davis v.
Passman,90 the Court extended the Bivens theory to fifth amend-
ment due process violations. Last Term, in Carlson v. Green,9 the
Court added eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claims, despite the existence of alternative relief under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.2
To date, the Court has not directly addressed the matter of Biv-
ens relief via the fourteenth amendment. Its boldest dictum in
favor of inferring such an action was stated in 1972 in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 3 six years prior to Monell. In City of Kenosha,
Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority that although a Section
1983 claim could not be brought against a municipality, on remand
the court should consider the availability of jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1331(a)." In a concurring opinion, 5 Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall added that if the plaintiffs could support their
claims of $10,000 in controversy, "then Section 1331 jurisdiction is
ing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).
88. The Supreme Court has resolved the related issue of determining when $10,000 must
be in controversy. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). Where the alleged harm is at least $10,000, "the sum claimed by the plaintiff con-
trols if the claim is apparently made in good faith," unless the court determines "to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount." Id. at 276 (quoting
from St. Paul Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)).
89. Federal courts have found implied causes of action arising from numerous provisions
of the Constitution. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth amend-
ment); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment). See also Jihaad v.
Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (first amendment); Berlin Democratic Club v.
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (first and sixth amendments); Patmore v. Carl-
son, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (fifth and eighth amendments).
90. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
91. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
93. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
94. Id. at 514.
95. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment that a municipality is not a
"person" under § 1983. Id. at 516.
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available. . and they are clearly entitled to relief."'  Four years
later, however, in City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International As-
sociation of Firefighters,91 the Court found Section 1983 grounds
dispositive of the case and refused to address the issue of whether
the claim could be brought under Section 1331(a). 8 Finally, in
Carlson, Chief Justice Burger specifically stated his fear that the
Court would extend Bivens to fourteenth amendment claims de-
spite the adequate alternative remedy provided by Section 1983.99
Whether a majority of the Court is now willing to give force to
the City of Kenosha suggestion is of utmost concern to both mu-
nicipalities and police misconduct victims. Municipalities necessa-
rily argue that the Court's recent doctrinal expansion of Section
1983 implies a conclusion that Section 1983 is an adequate remedy.
Victims, however, have good reason to argue that the Court's re-
cent decisions in Davis v. Passman00 and Carlson v. Green 01 fore-
tell the availability of Bivens relief under the fourteenth
amendment.
In Davis, Congressman Passman's female secretary sued him for
damages and back wages, alleging that her termination constituted
sex discrimination in violation of her fifth amendment due process
rights. 02 The Court inferred a Bivens right of action 03 even
96. Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). The jurisdictional amount
for federal question jurisdiction under § 1331(a) has been eliminated. Federal Question Ju-
risdictional Amend. Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, - Stat. - (1980).
97. 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
98. Id. at 284 n.1. See also Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977).
99. 446 U.S. at 31 (Burger, J., dissenting).
100. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
101. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
102. 442 U.S. at 240-41. Mrs. Davis' claim of sexual discrimination was based in part on
the following letter by Congressman Passman:
Dear Mrs. Davis:
My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss you very much. But, in all
probability, inwardly they all agree that I was doing you an injustice by asking you to
assume a responsibility that was so trying and so hard that it would have taken all
the pleasure out of your work. I must be completely fair with you, so please note the
following:
You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you command the respect
of those with whom you work; however, on account of the unusually heavy work load
in my Washington Office, and the diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essen-
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though its holding in Cort v. Ash 4 appeared to dictate the oppo-
site result. The court distinguished Cort by stating that its stan-
dards were addressed to the judiciary's duty to construe Congres-
sional enactments, whereas the judiciary's duty to enforce
constitutional rights demanded different standards.10 5
The Davis Court established that a Bivens action for damages
inferred from the Constitution arises when four criteria are met.
First, the claimed liberty interest must be conferred by the Consti-
tution. 0 16 Second, there must be no adequate alternative form of
relief.L 0 7 Third, the harm suffered must lend itself to valuation in
damages, even though damages traditionally have been the appro-
priate remedy for liberty interest violations. 08 Finally, there must
be "'no explicit congressional declaration that persons' in peti-
tioner's position. . . may not recover money damages from' those
tial that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you will
agree with this conclusion.
It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your talent and experience in
my Monroe office because of the low salary that is available because of a junior posi-
tion. Therefore, and so that your experience and talent may be used to advantage in
some organization in need of an extremely capable secretary, I desire that you be
continued on the payroll at your present salary through July 31, 1974. This arrange-
ment gives you your full year's vacation of one month, plus one additional month.
May I further say that the work load in the Monroe office is very limited, and since
you would come in as a junior member of the staff at such a low salary, it would
actually be an offense to you.
I know that secretaries with your ability are yery much in demand in Monroe. If an
additional letter of recommendation from me would be advantageous to you, do not
hesitate to let me know. Again, assuring you that my Washington staff and your hum-
ble Congressman feel that the contribution you made to our Washington office has
helped all of us.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Is/ Otto E. Passman
OTTO E. PASSMAN
Member of Congress
Id. at 230 n.3. Section 717 of Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976). However, since Mrs. Davis was not hired into the competitive
service as is referenced in 2 U.S.C. § 92, she cannot avail herself of § 717 remedies. 442 U.S.
at 230, n.2, 247, nn.26-27.
103. 442 U.S. at 240-41.
104. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
105. 442 U.S. at 241-42.
106. Id. at 248.
107. Id. at 245.
108. Id.
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responsible for the injury."" 9
From this statement of the Court's guidelines for inferring a
damages action directly under the Constitution, it would appear
that a municipal inaction victim could make a prima facie showing
that he is entitled to bring his Bivens claim via the fourteenth
amendment. He would do so by pointing to the fourteenth amend-
ment, to the severe obstacle presented by the Section 1983 "pol-
icy" requirement, to his compensable harm, and to the fact that
Congress has not expressly prohibited him from obtaining relief
through a Bivens claim.
The most difficult point to make would be that the pro-munici-
pality courts' view of the "policy" requirement under Section 1983
constitutes a denial of adequate alternative relief under Section
1983 for harm resulting from municipal inaction. In making this
point, one must convince the court that he can show a causal link
between the municipal inaction and the harm, albeit an insufficient
link under the pro-municipality courts' view of Section 1983. To
accomplish this, one must show inaction following either a pattern
of misconduct or one severe incident, arguing that the municipality
was or should have been placed on notice of the need for corrective
action. Second, one must argue that if the pro-municipality courts
are correct in precluding his recovery by requiring that Section
1983 victims show unmistakable official approval, then they are
correct solely because the Court finds that by enacting Section
1983, Congress intended to cover nothing short of virtually express
municipal policy, thereby excluding municipal inaction victims.
However, to -say that Congress did not intend to cover municipal
inaction victims under Section 1983 is not to say that it would
disapprove of judicially created remedies to cover harm not ad-
dressed under Section 1983.110 Indeed, the entire object of the
Court's holdings in Bivens and Davis was to give approval to judi-
cially fashioned remedies for harm not otherwise compensable.
Armed with a strong argument under Davis, the municipal inac-
tion victim should be encouraged further by the Court's recent
109. Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
110. See notes 57-58 and 73-87 supra and accompanying text.
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holding in Carlson v. Green.111 There, the Court was faced with a
damages action under the eighth amendment.11 2 Unlike Davis,
however, the Court was called upon to determine whether a Bivens
remedy could be applied in a case which simultaneously gave rise
to relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).15
In Carlson, Marie Green brought suit against federal prison offi-
cials on behalf of her son's estate. She alleged that her son received
injuries in a severe beating and died because federal prison officials
failed to provide him with proper medical care. Further, she al-
leged that this failure constituted deliberate indifference in viola-
tion of her son's eighth amendment rights. 4 Claiming jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331(a),11 5 Mrs. Green sought compensa-
tory and punitive damages. " 6
Without benefit of the lower courts' discussion, the Supreme
Court determined that a Bivens remedy can be used to comple-
ment FTCA relief.117 The Court held that the victim of an uncon-
stitutional act has "a right to recover damages" under Bivens even
though no federal statute creates such a right of action in him.118
Further, it held that the defendant cannot defeat this action unless
he can show that Congress expressly has declared the alternative
remedy to be "a substitute" for Bivens relief and "viewed as
equally effective"11 9 or that "special factors [counsel] hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress."120 Without expla-
nation, the Court found that there were no special factors in this
111. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. In Davis, the plaintiff had no alternative federal statutory remedy. See note 102
supra and accompanying text.
114. 446 U.S. at 16.
115. See note 75 supra.
116. 446 U.S. at 16.
117. Id. at 17 n.2. The Court allowed the petitioner to raise the issue even though it had
not been presented below. The district and circuit courts agreed that the allegations stated a
claim under the eighth amendment and Bivens. Id. at 17. However, they disagreed on
whether the state wrongful death and survivorship statutes should be applied where they
serve to limit the amount of damages recoverable to less than the $10,000 jurisdictional
requirement for bringing a Bivens action. Id. at 17-18.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 18-19.
120. Id. at 19 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396.).
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case to counsel hesitation. 1 In support of its finding that Congress
has not expressly declared FTCA relief to be a substitute for Biv-
ens relief, the Court pointed to Congress' practice of "explicitly
stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. ' 122 As
further support, the Court referred to a Senate report which
expressly contemplated contemporaneous Bivens and FTCA
claims.1 23
The Court then launched into a seemingly unnecessary discus-
sion of additional factors which demonstrate the inadequacy of
FTCA relief and support "our conclusion that Congress did not
intend to limit respondent to an FTCA action.11 24 The factors
which the Court used to determine the inadequacy of alternative
relief are unimportant beyond the facts of this case.1 25 The critical
importance of this discussion lies in the fact that the Court ex-
plored Congress' unspoken intention, thereby softening its holding
that Bivens relief is available unless the defendant can show Con-
gress' express declaration that the alternative relief is exclusive
and adequate. Without excluding its conclusions regarding Con-
gress' unspoken intention, the Court summarized its holding:
"Plainly FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens' consti-
tutional rights, and without a clear congressional mandate we can-
not hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the
FTCA remedy.' 1 28
Justices Powell and Stewart concurred in the judgment, agreeing
that the majority correctly indexed the factors which demonstrate
FTCA inadequacy in this case and give rise to Bivens relief. How-
121. Id.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973)).
124. Id. at 20-21. The Court cites the following factors: that Bivens provides a more effec-
tive deterrent because it authorizes suit against individuals; that Bivens provides a right to
a jury trial and punitive damages; and that Bivens supplies uniformity of law, whereas an
FTCA claim is not actionable unless the state in which the violation occurred recognizes a
corresponding cause of action. Id. at 21-23.
125. These factors, while controlling on the issue of FTCA relief inadequacy, cannot be
read to control other cases without limiting Bivens relief to cases involving similar statutes.
Instead, they must be read consistently with the Court's philosophy that Bivens relief is
supplementary. So read, these factors are merely evidence that this plaintiff could not re-
ceive as extensive relief under the FTCA as he could under Bivens.
126. Id. at 23.
19811
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ever, they disagreed with the majority's rationale for inferring a
Bivens right of action. Their objection lay in the Carlson major-
ity's unwarranted expansion of the Bivens doctrine through re-
statement of the Davis guidelines. Under Davis, they noted that
the defendant can defeat a prima facie case by showing the ade-
quacy of the alternative relief; however, under Carlson, the defen-
dant also must show that Congress expressly declared the alterna-
tive relief exclusive. 127
Although two justices dissented, five justices clearly supported
an expansion of the Davis guidelines.1 28 Likewise, seven justices
approved the inference of a Bivens remedy in a case where the al-
ternative relief was inadequate and where "there are reasonably
clear indications that Congress did not intend that statute to dis-
place Bivens claims. ' 129
1H. CONCLUSION: THE TEST CASE
The best case to present to the Court is one in which recovery is
denied pursuant to the lower court's view that municipal inaction
does not constitute an official policy within the meaning of Section
1983 and that a Bivens remedy cannot be extended to fourteenth
amendment claims. Such a case would point up the harsh conse-
quences brought on by the lack of uniformity among lower court
decisions and would hopefully spur the Court to pronounce amelio-
rative guidelines.
Whether the Court applies the Davis guidelines or the Carlson
expansion, the municipal inaction victim stands in a secure posi-
tion to recover. In appealing to the Carlson majority for an exten-
sion of the Bivens remedy to such fourteenth amendment claims,
the plaintiff need only point to the fourteenth amendment and to
the harm he has suffered from municipal inaction despite recurrent
violations. The burden then would shift to the municipality to
127. Id. at 25-29. The Davis majority actually stated that the plaintiff must allege an
inadequacy of alternative relief as part of his prima facie case. 442 U.S. at 243-44.
128. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in which Justices White, Blackmun,
Marshall and Stevens joined. Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissented. Chief Justice Burger
strongly expressed his fear that the majority soon would consider § 1983 an inadequate
remedy. Id. at 30. Justice Rehnquist stated his continued opposition to Bivens and what he
considers the Court's unwarranted penchant for legislating. Id. at 31-54.
129. Id. at 28 (Powell and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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show the adequacy of Section 1983 relief and Congress' express
declaration that it is exclusive and adequate or the existence of
special factors counselling hesitation. 30 Taking a careful approach
so as to persuade seven justices, however, the victim must read
Carlson conservatively and tailor his argument to the concurring
opinion. To do so, he must add to his Carlson argument a showing
that Section 1983 affords inadequate relief under the pro-
municipality courts' rigid policy requirements and be prepared to
counter "reasonably clear indications" that Congress intended Sec-
tion 1983 to be an exclusive remedy.'311 In so doing, however, he is
presented with no more difficult a showing than was required
under Davis.3 2
Whether relief as expansive as that provided by the Carlson ma-
jority will be forthcoming is difficult to predict. However, a sound
prediction is that the Court will soon feel compelled to turn its
attention to a grievous case of municipal inaction. When it does,
the Court will probably force municipalities to reconsider those
fiscal policies which sacrifice the quality of police officers' perform-
ance and result in the deprivation of civil rights.
130. See notes 117-26 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 106-10 supra and accompanying text.
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